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Abstract
In this paper, I investigate to what extent the cross-country variation in nominal
interest rates can be explained as being due to governments' optimal response to eco-
nomic conditions such as tax collection costs, tax evasion and government consumption
needs. In particular, I study the e®ects of costly income taxes in the presence of an
informal sector on the solution to a Ramsey problem in a general equilibrium frame-
work. Unlike most of the previous analyses of optimal in°ationary ¯nance, the model
postulates that conventional taxes carry collection costs whereas ¯at money can be
printed costlessly. For some countries, I measure tax collection costs, use the tax eva-
sion estimates reported in the literature, and then calculate the optimal interest rate
based on the model. Comparison of the actual and optimal interest rates demonstrates
that the model can in fact partly explain the observed deviations from the Friedman
Rule. I also show that allowing cross-country di®erences in the elasticity of substitution
between formal and informal sectors can increase the model's explanatory power.
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: E31, H21, H26, O17
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11 Introduction
There has been a huge variation in nominal interest rates, in°ation rates and seigniorage
revenues across countries. In this paper, I attempt to systematically account for these
cross-country di®erences in long-run monetary policy. In particular, I investigate to what
extent the variation in nominal interest rates can be attributed to governments' optimal
response to economic conditions such as tax collection costs, presence of an informal sector
and government consumption needs.
Using a simple cash-credit model in a dynamic general equilibrium framework, I study
the e®ects of tax collection costs in the presence of an informal sector on the solution to a
Ramsey problem. Then, for a variety of countries I measure tax collection costs and calculate
the optimal interest rate implied by the model. I ¯nd that even though substantial deviations
from the Friedman Rule are justi¯ed in an economy with a costly tax collection system and
tax evasion, the model fails to explain the whole variation in nominal interest rates across
countries.
As Keynes (1924) puts it, in°ationary ¯nance \is the form of taxation which the public
¯nd hardest to evade and even the weakest government can enforce, when it can enforce
nothing else." Table 1 demonstrates that in°ationary ¯nance has been widely used around
the world during the last quarter of the 20th century. Theoretically, however, Friedman
(1969) shows that only monetary policies that generate a zero net nominal interest rate will
yield to optimal resource allocation in the economy. This \Ramsey problem" result has been
proven to be robust for a wide range of dynamic monetary general equilibrium models with
income or consumption taxes. The ¯ndings are summarized in Correia and Teles (1999),
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), and Chari and Kehoe (1999), among others.
I extend the cash-credit model used in Chari and Kehoe (1999) to incorporate two poten-
tially very important issues in optimal monetary and ¯scal policy: tax collection costs and
tax evasion. Then I derive the relationship between these two factors and optimal interest
rate. The questions why there is an informal sector present in the economy and why some
tax systems are more ine±cient than others are outside the scope of this paper. Taking these
2two factors already as given in the economy I consider the optimal combination of in°ation
and conventional taxes1.
Unlike most of the previous analyses of optimal in°ationary policy, the model described
here postulates that conventional taxes, and speci¯cally income taxes, carry collection costs
whereas ¯at money can be printed costlessly. The idea behind this assumption is that the
government has to spend some resources to change and implement tax laws, audit claims,
enforce tax ¯ling and so on. However, ¯at money can be printed almost costlessly2. A linear
tax collection cost function is assumed throughout this paper both for simplicity of analysis
and because the US time series data of tax collection costs does not suggest otherwise.
In addition, I assume that there is an informal sector3 present in the economy contributing
to economic activity but not paying income taxes. This sector generally consists of unregis-
tered companies and small businesses that are usually owner-operated and that typically do
not engage in illegal activities; they are just not regulated or taxed by the government4.
In a small open economy shopping-time framework, V¶ egh (1989) ¯nds that the optimal
in°ation tax becomes an increasing function of government spending only when consumption
taxes carry increasing marginal collection costs. He also shows that the optimal in°ation
1One of the reasons for ine±ciency in tax collection might be that in some countries a large proportion of
output is produced by a large number of small, owner-run ¯rms and that it is very costly to the government
to enforce taxes on them. These countries happen to be mainly developing high in°ation countries, whereas
in other | mostly developed | countries, output is mainly attributable by a relatively small number of
big ¯rms. The managers of these big ¯rms have to keep accurate ¯nancial records to attract shareholders,
and the government can check those records without incurring high costs. Analyzing the link between tax
collection and distribution of companies by size could be a topic for further research.
2Banknote printing costs may be considered as an item of government consumption, since supplying the
medium of exchange to the public is a service provided by the government. Nonetheless, to have an exact
comparison of tax collection costs versus money printing costs, in the US during ¯scal year 1999 it cost 0.43
cents to collect 1 dollar in tax revenue whereas it cost only 0.022 cents to increase the money supply by 1
dollar.
3In the literature, the informal sector has also been called the underground sector, shadow economy, or
black market.
4Based on IRS statistics, Witte (1987) estimates that only 10% of the informal sector is engaged in illegal
activities in the US.
3tax does not depend on the level of government spending in the case of constant marginal
costs. However, the Ramsey problem in the paper lacks the implementability constraint and
therefore the results are not comparable. In this paper, I show that even a constant marginal
cost yields a positive relationship between the size of the government and the optimal interest
rate. One of the ¯ndings is that as government expenditures increase, the optimal interest
rate increases as well.
So far, three papers have explored the presence of an informal sector in a dynamic
monetary general equilibrium model. They all show that the Friedman Rule ceases to be
optimal once the informal sector is introduced in a Ramsey Problem. The ¯rst one of these
papers is Nicolini (1998). In a cash-credit economy with a continuum of consumption goods
he shows that the optimal net interest rate is strictly positive when there is an informal
sector in the economy that cannot be taxed by the government. However, empirically he
¯nds that his model can only account for a very small portion of observed in°ation rates even
in countries with very large underground sectors, such as Peru. This leads him to conclude
that the presence of an informal sector cannot explain the high in°ation rates observed
around the world.
In the second paper Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) assume the presence of a similar
informal sector in the economy. Using di®erent monetary models, they show that the Fried-
man Rule is not optimal. Using the U.S. economy as a baseline they ¯nd that for alternative
calibrations the annual in°ation tax can range from 0% to 22%. They also provide a welfare
analysis of reducing in°ation.
Finally, in the third paper, Koreshkova (2001) uses a shopping time model with a con-
tinuum of markets in the economy, and shows that high in°ation can be a result of optimal
¯nancing of a government budget in the presence of the informal sector as well. However,
she does not provide a numerical comparison between her model's implications and observed
in°ation rates.
In a related essay, de Fiore (2000) uses a shopping time model and shows that there
are conditions under which the Friedman Rule is still optimal despite the presence of tax
collection costs. Then she computes that the optimal annual nominal interest rate for the US
4economy to be less than 1% even when tax collection generates losses as high as 20% of the
revenues. Thus she concludes that tax collection costs cannot justify substantial deviations
from the Friedman Rule.
The present paper is di®erent from all of the above mentioned papers because it sys-
tematically accounts for the cross-country di®erences in monetary policy. I also model tax
collection costs and the presence of an informal sector simultaneously and estimate tax col-
lection costs for a variety of countries. Finally, I calculate steady state Ramsey interest rates
and compare them with 25-year averages.
I also have to stress that the purpose of this paper is not to explain the variation in
interest rates across time in a given economy. It is rather to gauge the explanatory power
of tax collection costs and presence of an informal sector for long-run deviations from the
Friedman Rule across countries.
I show that the optimal interest rate increases with the ine±ciency of the tax system,
with the size of the informal sector and with the size of the government. A noteworthy
policy implication is that it is very crucial for the governments to have an e±cient tax
collection system and to decrease the size of the informal sector in order not to have to rely
on in°ationary ¯nance.
The optimal net annual nominal interest rate for the U.S. is estimated to be 8.12%.
This corresponds to annual in°ation of 3.86%. When I compute the optimal interest rate
for the other countries in the sample, I ¯nd that for some of the countries the implied
interest rates are in fact very close to the observed ones. Particularly for the small group
of countries for which tax collection costs could be directly estimated, the model performs
fairly well. Nonetheless, the model overestimates the interest rate for the Asian countries, and
underestimates it for the Latin American countries. The elasticity of substitution between
formal and informal sectors turns out to be a crucial parameter to which the optimal interest
rate is quite sensitive. Since cross-country estimates of this parameter are not available in
the literature I use the benchmark value for each country. However, it might be possible that,
for example, the Latin American countries have a higher elasticity of substitution between
these two sectors, and that the optimal interest rates are therefore higher than my estimates
5based on the benchmark value. In that case the model would indeed predict interest rates
closer to the actual ones for those countries as well.
Using the available data, however, the model cannot explain the whole cross-country
variation in interest rates. I conclude that optimality considerations seem to account for only
a small fraction of the variation in nominal interest rates for some countries. Other factors,
such as politico-economic ones, may be more responsible for the cross-country variation in
monetary policy.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I present cross-country data on tax
collection cost and the informal sector. Section 3 explains the model, Section 4 states the
Ramsey problem and Section 5 gives the quantitative results. Section 6 concludes with policy
implications. The proof of the main proposition is given in the appendix.
2 Nominal Interest Rates, Tax Collection Costs, the
Informal Sector and Government Expenditures
In the literature it has been documented that for most countries, seigniorage revenue
is not the primary source of revenue for the government, but neither is it quantitatively
insigni¯cant (see Click (1998) and Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabelini (1992) for example).
Table 1 lists 25-year averages of annual nominal interest rates and seigniorage revenues for
23 countries. Average annual interest rates vary from about 3% in Switzerland to 113%
in Israel. Average seigniorage revenue | de¯ned as the share of new printed money in
nominal government expenditures | varies from 1.03% in Sweden to 29.29% in Peru; average
seigniorage revenue | de¯ned as the share of new printed money in nominal formal output
| varies from 0.19% in Switzerland to 11.62% in Israel.
There are two aspects of the deadweight loss associated with tax collection: tax collec-
tion costs incurred by the government and tax compliance costs borne by the taxpayers. In
this paper, the burden on the taxpayers is ignored since it is very di±cult | and some-
times impossible | to obtain estimates on tax compliance numbers, and focus on the tax
6collection costs incurred by the government. Still, one should keep in mind that this paper's
implications would be reinforced if the compliance costs were included in the model and in
the estimations5.
I approximate tax collection costs incurred by a government as the ratio of the tax
collection agency's budget to total tax revenue. Tax collection costs for the US between
years 1976 and 2000 are given in Table 2. Even though the numbers in the fourth column
are small, they are persistently di®erent from zero. On average, it cost 50 cents to raise 100
dollars tax revenue in the US during the period 1976-2000.
The data on total tax revenue and the budget of the tax collection agency for a selection
of countries is given in Table 3. The e±ciency of the tax collection system is de¯ned as one
minus the unit tax collection cost. The closer this parameter is to one, the fewer resources
are wasted during the tax collection process; hence a higher fraction of the tax revenue can
be used to ¯nance the government spending. According to the available data, the US seems
to be the most e±cient country in tax collection whereas Turkey is the least e±cient among
the countries listed.
On the other hand, the size of the informal sector is generally expressed as the ratio of
output produced by the informal sector to the output produced by the formal sector. There
are two broad approaches used in the literature for estimation: Surveys and tax audits
are examples of the direct approach; currency demand method, physical input (electricity
consumption) method, and Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes Model are examples of the
indirect approach. Applying some of these methods, Schneider and Enste (2000) estimate
the size of the informal sector for a variety of countries and Ä O¸ gÄ un» c and Y³lmaz (2000) for
Turkey during 1990s. In my estimation of optimal interest rates, I rely on the numbers that
these papers provide.
5Especially in the United States, the current income tax system is very complicated. For example, the
Internal Revenue Services estimated that the public spent nearly 6 billion hours in year 2000 on compliance
activities, such as record keeping, tax planning, form completion and form submission. Although the tax
systems in other countries are not as complicated as in the U.S., there are still tax compliance costs for the
consumers.
7The size of the government is also usually expressed as the share of government consump-
tion expenditures in total formal output. Table 4 gives data on the size of the government
and the size of the informal sector for the same group of countries as in Table 1.
Excluding Israel, the interest rates seem to decrease with the size of the government.
However, after inclusion of Israel the relationship disappears. Figure 1 shows this ¯nding6.
The positive relationship between the interest rates and the size of the informal sector is
shown in Figure 2. Less developed countries with a large informal sector | and probably
with less e®ective tax systems as well as large and pressing revenue needs | seem to use the
in°ation tax more intensively. The midpoint of the range reported in Table 4 was used as a
proxy for the size of the informal sector in this graph and later in the quantitative results
section.
3 Model
This is a version of the cash-credit model of Lucas and Stokey (1983) with costly income
taxes and an informal sector. This simple cash-credit model is chosen in order to make the
results comparable with the existing literature, e.g. Chari and Kehoe (1999).
There is a large number of identical in¯nitely lived consumers in the economy and time
is discrete. There are two types of goods: cash and credit goods. Cash goods can only be
bought with cash. Other than the payment technology used there is no di®erence between
these two types of goods.






where c1 denotes private consumption of the cash good, c2 denotes private consumption of
the credit good and h denotes leisure. The utility function is assumed to satisfy the INADA
conditions and has the usual concavity and monotonicity properties.
6Country codes are as in Heston et al. (2002) data set | ISO-136 classi¯cation system.
8In this economy there are two types of ¯rms: ¯rms registered with the government that
pay taxes, i.e. the formal sector, and ¯rms not registered with the government that evade
taxes, i.e. the informal sector, which together produce a ¯nal consumption good. Thus the
¯nal consumption good is assumed to be a composite of goods supplied by both the formal
and informal sectors. I assume that the total output produced by the formal and informal






where lF and lI are labor supplied by the representative agent to the formal and informal
sectors, respectively.














Each period the representative consumer supplies his labor to the registered and unreg-
istered ¯rms, pays taxes on labor income received from the registered ¯rms, receives his
return on bonds acquired previously, faces a cash-in-advance constraint for the cash good,
consumes cash and credit goods, and then acquires new bonds and new cash for the next
period with his remaining income.























where R(t) is the gross interest rate paid on nominal bonds, B(t), acquired last period, M(t)
is the money holdings, p(t) is the price level in the economy, and ¿(t) is the tax rate on
9formal labor income. The ¯rst constraint is the budget constraint; note that the consumer
only pays taxes on his income from the formal sector. The second constraint is the cash in
advance constraint for the cash good, the third one guarantees that total time spent on work
and leisure is equal to 1, and the fourth one lets the holdings of real debt be bounded from
above and below to rule out Ponzi schemes.
The government ¯nances its expenditures through printing new money, issuing new bonds
and collecting labor income taxes from registered ¯rms. However, the government must incur
certain costs while collecting taxes.
For simplicity of analysis, the tax collection cost function is assumed to be linear in tax





= (1 ¡ ·)¿(t)lF(t)wF(t) (4)
where 0 · · · 1 denotes the e±ciency of the tax system7. Therefore, the government's
period budget constraint is
R(t)B(t) + p(t)g(t) + p(t)(1 ¡ ·)¿(t)lF(t)wF(t) = M(t + 1) ¡ M(t) + B(t + 1)
+ p(t)¿(t)lF(t)wF(t)
(5)
where g(t) is a given stream of government consumption expenditures.
The resource constraint in this economy is





The last term on the left hand side signi¯es the resources used up during tax collection.











, and government policy is ¼ =
f¿(t)g1
t=0.
De¯nition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a government policy, ¼, a price system, q, and
an allocation, x, such that
7Note that this function has constant average and marginal costs.
101. given ¼ and q, the allocation x solves the representative consumer's utility maximiza-
tion problem (3).
2. given ¼ and q, the government's budget constraint (5) is satis¯ed for all t.
4 The Ramsey Problem
A Ramsey equilibrium is an optimal tax equilibrium where the government sets the tax
policy before consumers make their consumption and labor decisions. The objective of the
government is to choose the tax policy that would induce the highest possible utility for the
consumers.
De¯nition 2. A Ramsey equilibrium is an allocation x for the consumer and a government








subject to the constraint that there exists fM(t);B(t);¿(t)g1







is a competitive equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 1. [Ramsey Allocation] The consumption and labor allocations in a competitive
equilibrium satisfy:




















c1(t)Uc1(t) + c2(t)Uc2(t) ¡ (1 ¡ h(t))Uh(t)
¤
= 0 (9)










h(t) = 1 ¡ lF(t) ¡ lI(t) (12)
Furthermore, the allocations that satisfy the above equations can be decentralized as a
competitive equilibrium.
11Proof. : In the Appendix.
Constraint (7) resembles a feasibility constraint that has taken into account the ¯rst order
conditions of the consumer's problem. Constraint (8) guarantees that the gross nominal
interest rate is not less than 1 so that both government bonds and ¯at money are held by
the consumer in the equilibrium. Constraint (9) is the implementability constraint and is
obtained by adding the consumer's budget constraints for each period and using the ¯rst
order conditions of his utility maximization problem. And constraint (11) ensures that
the labor income taxes are non-negative | otherwise the tax collection cost would lose its
meaning.
Therefore the Ramsey Problem is to choose consumption and labor allocations that
maximize the consumer's lifetime utility (1) subject to (7){(12).
When the taxes are not costly to collect, i.e. · = 1, and when the informal labor is not
an input of the production function, then the model boils down to the corresponding one in
Chari and Kehoe (1999), where the Friedman Rule is optimal.
5 Quantitative Results
To analyze the quantitative implications of the model, functional forms for utility and
production functions are assumed and the Ramsey Problem is rewritten in this section.
I consider the steady state where the government's consumption expenditures, g(t), are
constant at level g, and solve for the optimal steady state interest rate in terms of the
preference and production parameters.
Let the utility function be a CES function





























8Note that the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal labor is equal to 1
1¡½.
12Corollary 1. For an economy with utility function (13) and production function (14) the






















1 ¡ lF(t) ¡ lI(t)
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(1 ¡ ´) ¡ ´
lF(t) + lI(t)

































Proof. : Follows from Proposition 1.
I assume that the government's consumption expenditures, g(t), are constant at level g
for each period, and then consider the steady state solution to the Ramsey problem where
the real variables are constant over time.
The parameters of the baseline economy are chosen to match the US macroeconomic
data. Table 5 lists the baseline parameters. A period is assumed to be a quarter. Thus
I set the period discount factor to be ¯ = 0:99. In the steady state the implementability
constraint implies that h = ´. Hence ´ is chosen to be 0.75 so that one quarter of the
representative consumer's time is allocated to work | which is roughly 40 hours a week.
The preference parameters ¾ and v for the US economy are estimated by Chari, Christiano,
and Kehoe (1991) using the demand function for real balances based on quarterly data. In
the baseline economy I use the values these authors report which are consistent with the
existing money demand literature.
13Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette (1994) estimate the elasticity of substitution between
formal and informal labor in Canada. Assuming that the elasticity of substitution between
formal and informal labor is about the same in the US, I use their estimate in my baseline
economy. Therefore ½ is assumed to be 0.71.
As given in Table 2, between 1976 and 2000 the size of the IRS budget on average
was 0.5% of the total tax revenue. Therefore I assume the e±ciency parameter of the tax
collection system, ·, to be 0.995 in the baseline economy.
The production parameter ® and the government expenditures parameter g are chosen
so that the size of the informal sector corresponds to 10% and the size of the government
corresponds to 20% of the formal output respectively at the resulting Ramsey equilibrium.
Therefore ® is set equal to 0:305 which yields
wIlI
wFlF = 0:1, and g is set equal to 0:0276 which
gives
g+(1¡·)¿wFlF
wFlF = 0:2 at the Ramsey equilibrium9.
For the baseline economy I ¯nd the optimal quarterly interest rate to be 1.97%. Therefore
the optimal annual interest rate is 8.12%, and the annual in°ation rate10 is 3.86%.
I also compute the annual seigniorage revenue for the baseline economy. At the Ramsey
equilibrium the seigniorage revenue has a 0.50% share of formal output or a 2.53% share
of government consumption expenditures. Note that these numbers are close to, but little
higher than, the actual ones.
Without tax collection costs, i.e. · = 1, the model predicts the optimal annual interest
rate to be 7.65%. Hence roughly a 0.5 percent di®erence in the optimal interest rate is due
to assuming that the unit cost of tax collection is 0.005.
The following ¯gures are based on the baseline economy parameters and illustrate the
relationship between the parameters and the optimal interest rate. Figure 3 shows how the
optimal annual interest rate responds to changes in the size of the informal sector. Note
that in this model the size of the informal sector as a share of formal output is determined
endogeneously in equilibrium. I observe that as ® increases, both the size of the informal
9Since the production function is constant returns-to-scale, the income | and thus the output | of the
formal and informal sectors can be approximated by the formal and informal labor wage shares, respectively.
10Consumer's ¯rst order condition in the steady state implies that 1 = ¯R
p(t)
p(t+1).
14sector and the Ramsey interest rate increase.
The negative relationship between the e±ciency of the tax system and the Ramsey in-
terest rate is shown in Figure 4. Where the e±ciency of the tax system is low, the optimal
interest rate is signi¯cantly high.
Figure 5 demonstrates that the optimal interest rate increases as the size of the govern-
ment increases. Again in this model the size of the government is determined endogeneously
in the equilibrium. The ¯gure shows that as the level of government consumption expendi-
tures, g, increases, both the size of the government and the optimal interest rate increase.
Higher ½ signi¯es higher substitutability between informal and formal labor. Intuitively,
therefore, a higher ½ means higher optimal interest rates for a given value of government
consumption expenditures, g, because the consumers will shift to the informal sector more
rapidly when they see higher tax rates, and the government will need to rely on seigniorage
revenue more. Figure 6 shows the high sensitivity of the optimal interest rates to the choice
of ½. For a country where it is easy to switch from formal sector to informal sector the
optimal interest rate will be much higher.
Then, for each country listed in Table 1, I ¯nd the optimal interest rate by varying the
parameter values of g and ® in the estimations so that the resulting Ramsey equilibrium
numbers match the actual sizes of the government and of the informal sector, respectively. I
also use the country speci¯c · value whenever available | if no estimate for · was reported
in Table 3, · is assumed to be equal to 0:995 as in the US. Table 6 documents the Ramsey
interest rates and the actual interest rates for the whole sample and Figure 7 charts the
¯ndings. For some of the countries in the sample, the estimated interest rates are very close
to the actual levels (e.g. Australia, India and Spain), and for some countries the actual and
the estimated interest rates di®er widely (e.g. Chile, Denmark, Malaysia and Peru).
In order to see how much of the cross-country variation in monetary policy the model
can explain, actual interest rates are projected on the Ramsey interest rates. Table 7 shows
the regression results with the standard errors given in parentheses. The adjusted R2 in
the complete sample is only 0.202 and most of the model's explanatory power comes from
one data point, namely Israel. Excluding that data point from the sample, the adjusted R2
15drops to 0.010. However, in both regressions the slope coe±cient is signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero and the hypothesis that it is di®erent from 1 cannot be rejected for any reasonable
con¯dence level.
However, in the small subsample of the countries for which the tax collection costs could
be directly estimated, the model performs fairly well in explaining the variation in nomi-
nal interest rates. Those countries are denoted with a square in Figure 7. An interesting
observation is that the interest rate is overestimated in Asian countries, whereas it is under-
estimated in Latin American countries. One possible explanation for this pattern could be
that the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal sectors are actually di®erent
from country to country. If | for example, in Latin American countries | this parameter is
higher than the benchmark value, then the optimal interest rates would be closer to observed
ones in those countries as well. However, with the available data, the model can only partly
explain the variation in monetary policy across countries. Other possible explanations for
this result are that some other element was missing in this model or that these governments
were not optimally responding to the factors considered here.
6 Conclusion
In this essay I have tried to systematically account for the di®erences in monetary policy
across countries. In particular, I have asked to what extent the variation in nominal interest
rates can be explained as being due to governments' optimal response to economic conditions
such as tax collection costs, presence of an informal sector and government consumption
needs. Using a cash-credit model with these factors, I have estimated optimal interest rates
for a variety of countries and compared my estimates with actual interest rates.
I ¯nd that for some reasonable parameter values the model implies quite high optimal
interest rates, and for some countries the estimated and actual interest rates are very close
to each other. In the small sample of countries with available tax collection cost data, the
model performs fairly well. However, in the whole sample it overestimates the interest rate
for the Asian countries, and underestimates it for the Latin American countries. I also ¯nd
16that the elasticity of substitution parameter between informal and formal sectors plays a
crucial role in the estimations. The model's explanatory power would further improve if
country speci¯c estimates of this parameter could be used. However, based on the available
data, I conjecture that optimality considerations seem to account for a small fraction of the
variation in nominal interest rates in these countries, or that these governments were not
optimally responding to the elements considered in the model here. It is still possible that
other factors, such as politico-economic ones, can be more responsible for the cross-country
variation in monetary policy. Further research needs to be done to ¯nd and analyze these
missing elements.
17Appendix
Proof of the Proposition 1 [Ramsey Allocation]:
This proof is similar to the corresponding one in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991).
First I need to show that these constraints are all satis¯ed in a competitive equilibrium.
At a competitive equilibrium, the allocation x must satisfy the period budget constraint
of both the government and the consumer:
R(t)B(t) + p(t)g(t) = M(t + 1) ¡ M(t) + B(t + 1)
+ ·p(t)¿(t)lF(t)wF(t)






Adding these two equations and then dividing by p(t), I get
c1(t) + c2(t) + g(t) + (1 ¡ ·)¿(t)lF(t)wF(t) = lF(t)wF(t) + lI(t)wI(t)




wF(t). Using this condition and the fact that the production function is constant returns
to scale11 in the above equation I obtain (7).
Another ¯rst order condition of the consumer's problem (3) is that
Uc1(t)
Uc2(t) = R(t). Since
consumers would not be willing to hold bonds if their rate of return was strictly less than
the rate of return on ¯at money, it must be the case that R(t) ¸ 1. Thus Uc1(t) ¸ Uc2(t),
and (8) is satis¯ed as well.
In the literature constraint (9) is commonly called the implementability constraint. To
prove that it holds at a competitive equilibrium, I multiply the budget constraints of the
consumer by their Lagrange multipliers for each period, take their in¯nite sum and use the
¯rst order conditions of the consumer's problem to simplify the resulting expression. The
procedure is straightforward yet tedious and is left out here.
Condition (10) simply lists the non-negativity constraints for the labor supply and con-
sumption; they all have to be satis¯ed in a competitive equilibrium. Finally, condition (11)





18guarantees that the tax rate is non-negative - otherwise tax collection costs would lose their
meaning.
Next, I need to show that these equations completely characterize a competitive equilib-





Then I construct the interest rate as R(t) =
Uc1(t)
Uc2(t).
Note that the price level remains indeterminate. But I can de¯ne all variables in the
economy in real terms. Because of the cash-in-advance constraint, real money holdings will
be equal to the consumption of the cash good,
M(t)
p(t) = c1(t).
Finally, real bond holdings can be constructed using the following equation, which can



















This completes the construction of the competitive equilibrium.
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21Table 1: Interest Rates and Seigniorage Revenues (1976-2000)
Country Interest Ratex Seigniorage Revenuey Seigniorage Revenuez
(%) (¢M=E) (¢M=GDP)
(%) (%)
Australia 11.54 1.61 0.36
Bolivia* 54.03 13.81 3.14
Canada 8.86 1.08 0.25
Chile* 39.86 28.67 7.53
Colombia 31.78 5.99 1.99
Denmark 7.20 2.04 0.62
Egypt 12.63 11.82 4.80
Greece 17.66 4.54 1.35
India 10.04 12.57 1.89
Israel* 113.47 16.49 11.62
Italy 12.22 1.73 0.59
Malaysia 5.03 8.73 2.07
Mexico* 30.80 11.48 2.90
Norway 9.11 1.09 0.38
Peru 103.97 29.29 4.78
Portugal 14.69 2.18 0.85
South Korea 7.56 6.26 0.92
Spain 10.80 4.84 0.96
Sweden 7.40 1.03 0.43
Switzerland 3.31 1.84 0.19
Turkey 43.17 15.18 3.14
United States 6.67 1.26 0.39
Uruguay* 88.10 20.14 4.95
Source: International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics.
x : 25-year averages of end of period discount rates, series 60 of IMF IFS. For countries
marked with an asteriks the lending rate, series 60P, was used instead to obtain the longest
data.
y : 25-year averages of change in reserve money - government consumption expenditures
ratio (series 14 and 82, respectively).
z : 25-year averages of change in reserve money - nominal GDP ratio (series 14 and 99b,
respectively).
22Table 2: Tax Collection Costs for the US (1976-2000)
Fiscal year Operating Costsx Gross Collections y Cost of Collecting $100z
1976 1,667,311,689 302,519,791,922 0.55
1977 1,790,588,738 358,139,416,730 0.50
1978 1,962,129,287 399,776,389,362 0.49
1979 2,116,166,276 460,412,185,013 0.46
1980 2,280,838,622 519,375,273,361 0.44
1981 2,465,468,704 606,799,103,000 0.41
1982 2,626,338,036 632,240,505,595 0.42
1983 2,968,525,840 627,246,792,581 0.47
1984 3,279,067,495 680,475,229,453 0.48
1985 3,600,952,523 742,871,541,283 0.48
1986 3,841,983,050 782,251,812,225 0.49
1987 4,365,816,254 886,290,589,996 0.49
1988 5,035,543,000 935,106,594,000 0.54
1989 5,198,546,063 1,013,322,133,000 0.51
1990 5,440,417,630 1,056,365,651,631 0.52
1991 6,097,627,226 1,086,851,401,315 0.56
1992 6,536,336,443 1,120,799,558,292 0.58
1993 7,077,985,000 1,176,685,625,083 0.60
1994 7,245,344,000 1,276,466,775,871 0.57
1995 7,389,692,000 1,375,731,835,498 0.54
1996 7,240,221,000 1,486,546,674,000 0.49
1997 7,163,541,000 1,623,272,071,000 0.44
1998 7,564,661,000 1,769,408,739,000 0.43
1999 8,269,387,000 1,904,151,888,000 0.43
2000 8,258,423,000 2,096,916,925,000 0.39
Source: IRS Data Book, Fiscal Year 2001, Publication 55b.
x: In US dollars. Represents actual IRS operating costs, exclusive of reimbursements received
from other Federal agencies for services performed.
y: In US dollars. Starting with Fiscal Year 1988, gross collections exclude alcohol and tobacco
taxes and, starting with the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1991, exclude taxes on ¯rearms,
when responsibility for all these taxes was transferred to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms. Also, starting with Fiscal Year 1993, gross collections exclude foreign treaty
money and arbitrage rebates.
z : In US dollars. Ratio of column 2 to column 3 times 100.
23Table 3: Tax Collection Costs for Some Countries
Country Total Tax Budget of Tax E±ciency of the
Revenuey Collection Agencyy Tax Systemz
Australia 149,023 4,613 0.969
Canada 169,676 4,561 0.973
Israel 124,295 1,246 0.989
Norway 498,504 3,838 0.992
Turkey 2,244,094,000 308,629,000 0.862
US 1,486,547 7,241 0.995
Sources: Department of Finance and Administration of Australia (¯scal year 1999-2000);
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (¯scal year 2000-2001); Ministry of Finance of Israel
(¯scal year 1999); Ministry of Finance of Norway (¯scal year 1999); Central Bank of the Re-
public of Turkey, and Ministry of Finance of Turkey (¯scal year 1996); US Internal Revenue
Services (¯scal year 1996).
y: The numbers are in millions of national currency of the listed countries.
z : One minus the ratio of the budget of tax collection agency to total tax revenue.
24Table 4: The Size of the Government and the Size of the Informal Sector
Country Size of the Size of the
Governmenty Informal Sectorz






















United States 19.75 6.7-13.9
Uruguay 12.91 35.2
Sources:
y : The size of the government is computed as the ratio of government consumption ex-
penditures to domestic output produced by the formal sector, series 91f and 99b of the
International Monetary Fund IFS, respectively. The numbers reported here are averages
over the period 1976-2000.
z : Informal sector size estimates are ratios of output produced by informal sector to output
produced by formal sector in a year during the period 1989-1993. A range indicates that at
least two methods were applied in the estimations, reported in Schneider and Enste (2000)
and Ä O¸ gÄ un» c and Y³lmaz (2000).
25Table 5: Baseline Economy Parameters
Preferences Production Government
¯ ´ ¾ v ½ ® · g
0.99 0.75 0.57 0.83 0.71 0.305 0.995 0.0276
Table 6: Actual and Ramsey Annual Interest Rates























United States 6.67 8.12
Uruguay 88.10 18.10
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and author's estimates based on the model.






































n = 6 R-square = 0.998 adj. R-square = 0.996
n = 23 R-square = 0.238 adj. R-square = 0.202
n = 22 R-square = 0.058 adj. R-square = 0.010
27Figure 1: Size of the Government and Interest Rates
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Figure 2: Size of the Informal Sector and Interest Rates
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29Figure 5: The Size of the Government and Ramsey Interest Rates




















































































































































30Figure 7: Actual and Ramsey Interest Rates
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